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MODELLING VALUE-ADDED TAX IN THE PRESENCE OF 
MULTIPRODUCTION AND DIFFERENTIATED EXEMPTIONS 
 
James A. GIESECKE1 and TRAN Hoang Nhi  




We develop a framework for economy-wide modelling of value-added tax systems. Our framework 
models a number of complexities of VAT systems as they are implemented by tax agencies. In 
particular, we model multiple rates, multiple exemptions, multiple degrees of refundability across 
commodity users, and multi-product enterprises. A detailed VAT framework is important for correct 
modelling of VAT within a general equilibrium model. Such a framework is also of value in correctly 
representing the distribution of indirect tax payments within the database of a general equilibrium 
model, a prerequisite of accurate welfare analysis. We use the model to analyse the effects of 
simplifying Vietnam’s complex VAT system. We simplify the system by moving from three tax rates to 
one budget-neutral rate, while also removing many discretionary exemptions.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1960s, value added tax (VAT) systems have been progressively adopted around 
the world1. The majority of VAT regimes are characterised by a consumption tax base with 
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multiple tax rates, multiple exemptions, and the credit method of tax liability calculation2. 
These VAT characteristics have been incorporated in a number of formal studies on the 
incidence and economic effects of VAT. However, three important VAT characteristics have 
yet to be formalised in applied VAT research: multi-production, legislated differences in 
exemption status, and industry-specific differences in the refundability of VAT paid on inputs 
to production and investment. The need for careful and detailed treatment of these VAT 
characteristics is particularly important in disaggregated general equilibrium models. These 
models are recognised as well suited to analysis of the efficiency effects of tax policies3. The 
modelling of VAT within a general equilibrium framework raises a fourth issue not yet 
addressed in the VAT modelling literature. Even in highly disaggregated models, commodity 
and industrial definitions will be, by necessity, aggregates of hundreds or thousands of 
commodities and industries, each with the possibility of distinct tax rates and exemptions 
under the relevant nation’s VAT statutes. Previous studies have assumed that a commodity is 
either exempt or taxed. In this paper we provide a comprehensive method for modelling VAT 
in a detailed economy-wide setting. Our method addresses the four aforementioned VAT 
features. We apply our technique to the complex Vietnamese VAT system, and examine the 
macroeconomic consequences of VAT simplification for this developing economy. 
In recent years, the Vietnamese indirect tax system has been streamlined and simplified. 
Nevertheless, a wide range of tax rates and tax exemptions remain. Prior to 1999 a Turnover 
Tax, levied at rates ranging from 0.5% to 40%, was levied on gross sales revenue. Criticised 
for its cascading effects, the Turnover Tax was replaced by a VAT in January 1999. The VAT 
was initially levied at four rates: 0, 5, 10 and 20 per cent. Since January 2004 the VAT rate 
structure was reduced to three rates: 0, 5 and 10 per cent. Sales to exports and additions to 
stocks attract the zero VAT rate. So too do sales of certain commodities to all users. These 
commodities include irrigation services, public administration, education, health care and 
dwellings services. In general, the 5 per cent rate attaches to unprocessed agricultural 
commodities at the commercial trading stage, certain primary building materials, chemicals, 
fertilisers, pharmaceuticals, certain machinery, metal products, animal feed, publishing, water, 
road transport, rail transport, air transport, scientific services, and cultural services. All other 
commodities are taxed at 10 per cent. Sales of mining to export are explicitly declared VAT 
exempt, despite the zero rate applying to export sales. A number of VAT exemptions are also 
made for goods and services deemed either essential or important for economic development. 
These include raw agricultural materials, imported machinery and equipment used in R&D 
and capital formation, health and education services, public broadcasting, cultural events and 
sanitation works.  
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With its many rates and exemptions, the Vietnamese VAT system is complex. The 
literature on indirect taxation recognises that this imposes two economic costs. First, it creates 
allocative efficiency losses, via its distorting effects on relative prices4. Second, it creates 
technical efficiency losses, because complexity adds to the VAT compliance and enforcement 
burden5. The presence of these costs suggests that welfare gains are available from a revenue-
neutral simplification of the present system. In this paper, we explore the gains for Vietnam 
from a move to a single VAT rate that is revenue neutral in the presence of simultaneous 
removal of discretionary VAT exemptions. We do this with a dynamic CGE model of 
Vietnam that contains explicit modelling of the complexity of the Vietnamese VAT system. 
To our knowledge, this is the most detailed economy-wide modelling of VAT undertaken for 
any economy, developing or developed. We find that the allocative efficiency gains from 
VAT simplification are small, particularly when compared with the effects of compliance 
costs. We find that a feature of the present Vietnamese VAT system is taxation of capital 
accumulation. Our policy of equalised VAT rates and removal of policy exemptions reduces 
capital taxation. As such, the policy promotes capital accumulation. This is an important 
source of potential gain for Vietnam.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a general 
framework for modelling value-added tax in the presence of multi-production, differentiated 
rates and differentiated exemptions. We implement this method for Vietnam, integrating our 
VAT modelling framework within a large-scale dynamic general equilibrium model. Section 
3 provides an overview of this model, VIPAG6. Section 4 describes simulation settings. 
Section 5 discusses results and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2.  A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR VAT MODELLING 
The ideal VAT regime, imposing on an economy the lowest level of distortions and 
compliance costs, is that with a single rate on all domestic sales, a zero-rate on exports, and 
no exemptions (see Tait, 1988 and Ebrill et al., 2001). Under the ideal VAT regime, the VAT 
is equivalent to a consumption tax: producers pay VAT on their outputs, but fully reclaim 
VAT paid on their intermediate inputs. The effective tax rates on producers are thus zero. As 
such, the tax creates no cascading effect through production chains. The effective tax rates on 
final consumers are the same as the legislated tax rates. This is the type of VAT often 
modelled in early general equilibrium studies (see, for example Ballard et al., 1987a; Ballard 
at al., 1987b; Kehoe et al., 1988). It is also typically assumed by statisticians in compiling 
input-output tables, resulting in zero values for all cells in the tax matrix for intermediate 
usage and capital formation.  
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In practice, VAT systems contain exemptions. Exemptions are often granted to basic goods 
(such as certain foods, medicines, education and healthcare services) and hard-to-tax services 
(such as housing, finance and insurance). Extensive discussions on these issues and their 
effects on the economy can be found in Tait (1988) and Ebrill et al. (2001). Producers of 
exempted goods do not charge VAT on their outputs, but they cannot obtain credits for VAT 
paid on their inputs. These input taxes are passed on to users of the exempt commodity, 
irrespective of whether they are a final user or another producer. This creates tax cascading 
effects, with positive effective VAT rates faced by all producers using the exempt goods. This 
problem is well-recognised in the VAT literature. It was first explored analytically in 
Gottfried and Wiegard (1991), who assume that exemptions apply to all users. Later VAT 
researchers have adopted their method (Marks, 2005; Toh and Lin, 2005).  
There are other well-known features of implemented VAT systems that do not yet appear 
in the formal VAT modelling literature. Our VAT modelling method addresses these features. 
First, many firms produce multiple commodities. Firms producing both taxable and exempt 
goods can reclaim only taxes paid on inputs to production of taxable goods. Second, 
exemptions are often granted to some users but not others. Third, while most industries may 
receive tax credits on inputs to their capital formation, others may not. As we shall see below, 
with this complexity, effective VAT tax rates on production and capital formation depend not 
only on legislated VAT rates, but also on the input structure of production and capital 
formation, the commodity composition of output, and the structure of commodity sales. A 
fourth issue arises in the application of published supply/use data in VAT modelling. 
Published data, even with very high levels of commodity and user detail, will aggregate 
transactions with different tax and exemption statuses under the legislated VAT code. 
Previous studies have assumed that a commodity is either exempt or not, disregarding the 
practical consequences of this assumption for applied tax work. We describe below a method 
that addresses these four issues, and describe its implementation for our Vietnamese tax 
simplification study.  
We assume an economy of M commodities and U agents. The U agents are comprised of: 
N industries, K capital creators, and F final demanders. The economy and its VAT regime 
have the following features: 
1. Multi-production. We represent multi-production via , the share of total sales of 
industry j (j
,c jSO
∈N) represented by sales of commodity c (c∈M). In our VIPAG 
implementation, M = 113 and N = 1137. We evaluate  using VIPAG’s MAKE 
matrix.      
,c jSO
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2. Differentiated legislated VAT rates. We represent differences in legislated VAT rates 
across commodities and users via , a matrix of legislated VAT rates on sales of 
commodity c (c∈M) purchased by user u (u
,c uLR
∈U). In VIPAG, U = 230, comprised of 
113 industries (N = 113), 113 capital creators (K = 113) and four final users, 
households, export, government and stocks (F=4). We evaluate the 113 x 230  
matrix for VIPAG through careful inspection of the Vietnamese tax code (Ministry of 
Finance 2007a, National Assembly 2003). Typical VIPAG values for  are 0, 0.05 
and 0.10.   
,c uLR
,c uLR
3. Differentiated VAT exemptions. We model exemptions via ,c uEX , a coefficient 
measuring the share of sales of commodity c (c∈M) to user u (u∈U) that are VAT 
exempt. For most flows, ,c uEX  is zero. ,c uEX  has a non-zero value where the tax code 
exempts from VAT some or all of the sales of commodity c to user u. For full 
exemption, ,c uEX  = 1. For partial exemption, 0< ,c uEX <1. The latter reflects 
aggregation. For example, many countries exempt textbooks. But in most models, 
textbooks are just part of the broader commodity “publishing”. We assume that if 
textbooks comprise 40 per cent of “publishing” sales to user u, then =0.4,publishing uEX
8.  
4. Differentiated VAT refundability on VAT paid on inputs to capital formation. We use 
the parameter (2),c jφ  to denote the proportion refunded of VAT paid by industry j (j∈K) 
on purchases of c (c∈M) for capital formation. Most VAT systems provide for full 
refund of VAT paid on inputs to capital formation. Hence for most c,j, (2),c jφ =1. 
However an important exception is construction of dwellings. Consistent with long-run 
input-taxation of dwellings services, most VAT systems provide no refund of VAT 
paid on inputs to housing construction. This is true of the Vietnamese VAT system. The 
Vietnamese system also disallows VAT refunds on specialised equipment and 
machinery used in capital formation by public administration, health and education.  
Having specified and evaluated , , ,c jSO ,c uLR ,c uEX  and 
(2)
,c jφ  we can now define ,c uER , 
the effective VAT rate applying on purchases of commodity c by user u. For non-business 
users (u ), we calculate the effective VAT rate as: F∈
,c uER  =       (, ,[1 ]c u c uLR EX× − ,c M u F∈ ∈ )                                        (E1)  
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For producers, calculation of the effective tax rate paid by industry j (j∈N) on purchases of 
input c (c∈M),  ,c jER  is complicated by two things: the refundability of VAT paid on inputs 
to current production, and the multiproduction structure of the economy.  
At first, when producer j buys input c, it must pay a VAT rate equivalent to the legislated 
rate less the exemption proportion applicable to c and j, that is, LRc,j x (1-EXc,j). Industry j can 
then reclaim this tax, but only to the extent input c is used to produce non-exempt goods. We 
define a refund factor, (1)jφ , as the proportion of industry j’s VAT payments on inputs to 
production that is refunded by the tax authority. To calculate (1)jφ  we need to look at two 
dimensions of industry j’s sales: what it produces, and to whom it sells. Data on the first 
dimension is provided by . For the second dimension, we introduce , the share of 
total sales of commodity c sold to user u. We can evaluate  from row shares in the CGE 
model’s input-output database. We can now define
,c jSO ,c uSS
,c uSS
(1)
jφ  as: 
     (1) , , ,[1 ]j c j c u c uc M u U SO SS EX∈ ∈=∑ ∑φ −     ( j N∈ )               (E2)  
With (1)jφ  defined, we calculate the effective VAT rates paid by industry j as:  
,c jER  = 
(1)
, ,[1 ][1 ]c j c j jLR EX× − −φ     ( ,c M j N∈ ∈ )                (E3)  
Having already defined (2),c jφ , the refund factor on purchases of c by j for capital formation, 
we calculate the effective VAT rate on inputs to investment as: 
,c jER  = 
(2)
, ,[1 ][1 ]c j c j c jLR EX× − − ,φ    ( ,c M j K∈ ∈ )                (E4)  
Equations (E1) to (E4) are our VAT model. The VAT model serves two purposes. First, it 
is required for construction of the CGE model’s database. We require a M x U matrix of VAT 
payments that is consistent with both published input-output data and the tax code. Equations 
(E1) to (E4) allows us to calculate this. Second, (E1) to (E4) become part of the CGE model’s 
theory. In placing (E1) – (E4) in the model, we now endogenously calculate: (i) effective 
VAT rates applying to flows of commodity c to user u, ( ,c uER ); and (ii) current production 
refund factors ( (1)jφ ), given (a) exogenously specified values for legislated VAT rates ( ); 
(b) exemption factors (
,c uLR
,c uEX ); and (c) capital formation refund factors (
(2)
,c jφ )9.     
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As apparent from the above equations, in the presence of exemptions the effective VAT 
rates on final consumption can differ from the legislated rates, and VAT rates on inputs to 
production and investment can differ from zero. Our calculations show that in 2005 only 62.6 
per cent of VAT collections come from final consumption. VAT collections from  production 
and investment comprise 29.4 and 8.0 per cent respectively10. 
3. OVERVIEW OF VIPAG – A DYNAMIC CGE MODEL OF VIETNAM 
Our aim is to assess the macroeconomic and sectoral consequences of Vietnamese VAT 
reform. To do this, we require an economy-wide model. Since the VAT model described in 
Section 3 requires high levels of commodity and user detail, our economy-wide model must 
also possess such detail. Hence we use VIPAG, a dynamic CGE model of the Vietnamese 
economy possessing high levels of commodity and user disaggregation. VIPAG is a 
Vietnamese implementation of the well-known MONASH model (Dixon and Rimmer 2002). 
Giesecke and Tran H.N. (2008a, 2008b) document the Vietnam implementation of the model. 
However, readers of this paper do not need to be familiar with the details of these references, 
since our discussion of results in Section 5 relies on standard economic mechanisms. We 
provide a brief overview of VIPAG below.       
VIPAG has 113 industries and 113 commodities. Three primary factors are identified 
(labour, capital and land) with labour further distinguished by skill. The model has one 
representative household and one central government. Optimising behaviour governs 
decision-making by firms and households. Each industry minimises unit costs subject to given 
input prices and a constant returns to scale (CRS) output function. Household demands are 
modelled via a representative utility-maximising household. Units of new industry-specific 
capital are cost minimising combinations of Vietnamese and foreign commodities. Imperfect 
substitutability between imported and domestic varieties of each commodity is modelled 
using the Armington CES assumption. The export demand for any given Vietnamese 
commodity is inversely related to its foreign-currency price. The model recognises 
consumption of commodities by government, and the details of direct and indirect taxation 
instruments. It is assumed that all sectors are competitive and all markets clear. Purchasers’ 
prices differ from producer prices by the value of indirect taxes and trade and transport 
margins. VIPAG recognises three types of dynamic adjustment: capital accumulation, net 
liability accumulation and lagged adjustments. Capital accumulation is industry-specific, and 
linked to industry-specific net investment. Annual changes in the net liability positions of the 
private and public sector are related to their annual investment/savings imbalances. In policy 
simulations, the labour market follows a lagged adjustment path. In the short-run, real 
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consumer wages are sticky. Hence short-run labour market pressures mostly manifest as 
changes in employment. In the long-run, employment returns to basecase11, with labour 
market pressures reflected in changes in real wages. The model is calibrated to the 
Vietnamese input-output table for 2005 (PAG 2007), and is solved with the GEMPACK 
economic modelling software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). 
4. SIMULATION DESIGN 
4.1.  VAT simplification: a policy of revenue-neutral VAT rate equalisation and 
exemption removal. 
We investigate a program of simplification of the Vietnamese VAT system. We examine 
the effects of this policy by comparing the forecast path of the economy with the reform 
against a basecase forecast path of the economy without the reform. Hence, relative to our 
basecase forecast12, our policy simulation makes the following changes in 2008: 
 (i) We remove discretionary VAT exemptions. In terms of equations (E1) through (E4), 
we reduce the values of selected elements of ,c uEX . 
 (ii) All VAT rates are equalised at a single rate, designed to be revenue neutral in the 
presence of removal of discretionary exemptions. This rate is 8.3 per cent. We 
calculate this rate in a side simulation (see below). In terms of equations (E1) through 
(E4), we set all = 0.083. ,c uLR
(iii) We improve primary factor productivity. This reflects our conjecture that removal of 
VAT exemptions and multiple VAT rates will lower VAT compliance costs.   
To calculate the single VAT rate that is revenue neutral in the presence of removal of 
discretionary policy-related exemptions, we run a side simulation with VIPAG. Holding 
aggregate VAT revenue exogenous, we force the model to find a single VAT rate consistent 
with unchanged aggregate VAT revenue, while simultaneously removing discretionary 
exemptions. As we discussed in Section 2, the present VAT system contains many 
exemptions. Some relate to the need to input-tax services such as finance and dwellings. 
Other exemptions are public policy decisions. We remove such discretionary exemptions on:  
i.    sales of mining to exports;  
ii. fresh food products; 
iii. publishing; 
iv. sales of transport services to exports; 
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v.  sales of science, technology, education, health, culture and sport, associations, to non-
government users.  
We also introduce refunds on purchases of equipment by health and education for capital 
formation (in the basecase forecast, VAT paid on such transactions are not refunded, that is, 
in terms of equation (E4), (2),c jφ =0).   
With the above changes, we are still left with a number of exemptions, in particular those 
related to hard-to-tax services, namely: 
i. sales of finance services;  
ii. life insurance; 
iii. all intermediate inputs to dwellings services;  
iv. sales of community services. 
We also retain basecase exemptions on sales by industries dominated by many small 
traders, in particular: agricultural industries, trade, and repairs. As in the basecase, we assume 
a 50 per cent rate of exemption on such sales, to reflect low registration for VAT among small 
traders.  
Our side simulation indicates that a single VAT rate of 8.3 per cent is revenue-neutral in 
the presence of the aforementioned changes to exemptions and refund factors. Hence our 
policy simulation involves making these changes in exemptions and refunds in 2008, while 
moving all VAT rates to 8.3 per cent. Since this simplifies the VAT system, we conjecture 
that this will reduce compliance costs. We model lower compliance costs via a change in 
primary factor productivity calibrated to contribute 0.3 percentage points to real GDP. We 
outline below our justification for this value.   
4.2. The costs of VAT compliance and administration 
As discussed in Section 1, Vietnam’s VAT system is complicated, with three tax rates and 
numerous exemptions across commodities and taxpayers. In complying with this tax system, 
businesses and government incur expenses. Following Tran N.B. (2001) and Vaillancourt and 
Clemens (2008) we refer to these expenses as private-sector compliance costs and public 
administrative costs. We conjecture that these expenses will be lower under a simpler VAT 
system.   
There is a common agreement among tax researchers that the simpler a tax system (that is, 
the fewer the rates and exemptions) the lower will be compliance and administrative costs 
(see, for example, Tait, 1988; Salvail 1994; Le, 2003). Watanabe and Duong (2006) discuss in 
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detail the costs associated with the multiple rates and exemptions under Vietnam’s present 
VAT system. They argue that additional costs, compared with a simpler system with only one 
rate and no or very few exemptions, arise from two issues. First, taxpayers producing goods 
that are both taxable and exempt must not only distinguish taxable and non-taxable sales to 
calculate VAT payments, they also face a complex input tax credit calculation since VAT 
refunds can only be sought for tax paid on inputs related to taxable items. Second, both tax 
payers and tax authorities must identify and apply the correct tax rate on each transaction. Not 
only does this add to compliance and administration costs, it promotes opportunities for tax 
fraud. Tax fraud creates additional economic costs, as it diverts private resources towards 
identifying opportunities for fraud, and public resources towards uncovering fraud and 
prosecuting its perpetrators.    
Since our policy equalises rates and reduces exemptions, we expect compliance and 
administrative costs to fall. However, there are no independent estimates of the likely size of 
reductions in such costs for Vietnam. As we shall argue below, we think a plausible estimate 
of the present level of such costs is around 0.6 per cent of GDP. This is higher than that in 
other countries with simpler VAT systems. For other countries, VAT compliance and 
administration costs represent about 0.3 per cent of GDP. In the simulation we report in this 
section, we assume that VAT simplification will reduce compliance costs by the difference 
between these numbers, that is, 0.3 percentage points of GDP.    
We begin by calculating private sector compliance costs per firm based on an estimate by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the World Bank (2006). They found that a modest-sized 
Vietnamese company with 60 employees must spend 300 hours per year on consumption tax 
compliance activities. Since VAT constitutes the bulk of Vietnamese consumption taxation, 
and it is the only consumption tax that affects most businesses13, we can attribute much of the 
300 hours to VAT compliance14. This translates to a labour cost of VND 5.6 million per 
enterprise15. Firms also incur intermediate input and capital expenses in complying with the 
VAT16. We also estimate these expenses at VND 5.6m. per enterprise17. Hence we place a 
typical enterprise’s VAT compliance costs at VND 11.3m.  
Next, we extrapolate our enterprise costs to the economy-wide level. We put the number of 
businesses in Vietnam in 2005 at approximately 2.8 million18. These businesses differed 
greatly in size. More than half of businesses had only one employee, a third employed 2-5 
persons, 6 per cent employed 6-50 persons, and only about 1 per cent employed more than 50 
persons. Furthermore, not all businesses registered for VAT. To account for these factors, we 
used the following procedure to estimate aggregate private compliance costs.   
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First, we divide the compliance cost of VND 11.3 m. per modest-sized business with 60 
employees (calculated above) into a fixed and variable cost component19. We assume that the 
fixed cost is 10 per cent of the total cost (VND 1.13 m.). The variable cost depends on the size 
of businesses, which we proxy by number of employees20. The average variable cost per 
employee is VND 0.17 m. per year (= (11.3 – 1.13) /60). Hence the average annual 
compliance cost for a business with L employees, registered for VAT, is 1.13 + 0.17 x L 
(VND m.).  
Only a certain proportion of firms in each size category have registered for VAT. The 
smaller a firm, the less likely it is to register for VAT, since compliance costs are relatively 
high for small firms (Vaillancourt and Clemens, 2008; Tran N.B., 2000, 2001). We assume a 
registration rate of 100 per cent for businesses with more than 5 employees, 80 per cent for 
businesses with 4-5 employees, 70 per cent for businesses with 2-3 employees, and 50 per 
cent for one-employee businesses. Applying this to Establishment Census firm numbers, this 
results in about 1.7 million VAT payers in 2005, covering 60 per cent of all businesses. This 
is consistent with Watanabe and Duong (2006), who place the number of VAT payers in 2002 
at 1.45 million, covering 54 per cent of all businesses. Multiplying the total number of VAT 
registered businesses with the average compliance cost per business in each size category, we 
arrive at total private compliance costs of VND 3.5 trillion. This is 7.6 per cent of 2005 VAT 
revenue. 
VAT compliance and enforcement also involves public costs. We are unaware of such 
estimates for Vietnam, and there are few studies for foreign countries. An exception is 
Canada, where Salvail (1994) calculated recurrent public VAT enforcement costs at 3.2-3.6 
per cent of VAT revenue. Canada has a simpler VAT system than Vietnam, with only one rate 
of 7 per cent and few exemptions. On the basis of the Canadian study, we adopt 3.5 per cent 
as a lower-bound estimate of the public costs of VAT administration in Vietnam21.  
We estimate private compliance costs at 7.6 per cent of VAT revenue and public costs at 
3.5 per cent of VAT revenue. Hence we view 11 per cent of VAT revenue to be a plausible 
estimate of total (private plus public) compliance costs of the Vietnamese VAT. This is higher 
than estimates for other countries for which investigations of VAT compliance costs have 
been undertaken. A recent review of surveys of compliance costs by Vaillancourt and 
Clemens (2008) found total VAT compliance costs range between 3.7 and 7.3 per cent of total 
VAT collections. Given the relative complexity of Vietnam VAT, our higher estimate appears 
plausible.  
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For countries reviewed by Vaillancourt and Clemens (2008) and Tran N.B. (2000), which 
have simpler VAT systems than that of Vietnam, the average total compliance cost is 0.3 per 
cent of GDP22. Our estimate for Vietnam is equivalent to 0.6 per cent of GDP. We assume 
that VAT simplification will reduce Vietnamese compliance costs by the difference between 
these numbers: 0.3 per cent of GDP. We implement this as a uniform shift in primary factor 
productivity across all industries (except Dwellings) worth 0.3 percentage points of basecase 
2008 real GDP.   
4.3. Macroeconomic environment 
We adopt conventional closure assumptions for all macro variables other than real 
consumption. Our labour market closure is characterised by short-run stickiness in the real 
wage, with employment returning to basecase in the long-run. We allow the balance of trade 
to be endogenous, while accounting for changes in net foreign debt, net foreign interest 
payments, and gross national disposable income (GNDI). Industry-specific net investment is a 
positive function of rates of return. Capital stocks in each industry are sticky in the short-run, 
but adjust via changes in annual net investment to return rates of return towards basecase in 
the long-run. We expand on our real consumption closure below. 
Consumption is often determined in CGE models by: 
C G GNDI+ = Θ⋅             (E5)   
where C and G are nominal private and public consumption respectively,  is the average 
propensity to consume, and GNDI is nominal gross national disposable income. The 
percentage change form of (E5) is:  
Θ
C( ) G( ) [C G]( )C C G Gp x p x gndi+ + + = + ϑ+           (E6)   
where Cx  and Gx  are percentage changes in real private and public consumption 
respectively, Cp  and Gp  are percentage changes in private and public consumption deflators, 
 is the percentage change in the average propensity to consume, and  is the percentage 
change in GNDI. We define GNDI as: 
ϑ gndi
P G PGNDI GDP INT INT TRN TRN= − − + + G           (E7)  
where GDP is nominal GDP at market prices,  and  are interest payments on 
private and public net foreign debt respectively, and  and  are net foreign 




P G P GGNDI GDP ( ) INT INT TRN TRNgdp gdp P G P Ggndi p x int int trn trn= + − − + +        (E8)  
Substituting (E8) into (E6): 
P G P GC G [GDP INT INT TRN TRN ]
I [1 ]{C G } {X M } [C G]
C G gdp P G P G
I C G X M
x x x int int trn trn
p p p p p
+ = Θ − − + +
+Θ − −Θ + +Θ − + + ϑ       (E9) 
where I, X and M are nominal investment, exports and imports respectively, and Ip , Xp  
and Mp  are percentage changes in the price of investment, exports and imports respectively. 
 Equation (E9) is suitable for most simulations, properly capturing the impact on real 
consumption of changes in the terms of trade, real GDP and net foreign income. Hence it is a 
commonly-used consumption closure in CGE modelling. However it has two limitations. 
First, with ϑ  exogenous, deviations in national income will be split between consumption 
and savings in basecase proportions. As such, deviations in Cx  and Gx  will give damped 
indications of welfare movements. More importantly, with (E9) operational, the real 
consumption deviation will be damped whenever the price of investment falls strongly 
relative to the price of consumption23. As we shall see in Section 5, just such an outcome is 
the result of simplification of the Vietnamese VAT system. To let a fall in the relative price of 
investment affect consumption overlooks that less savings are now required to secure a given 
real level of investment. To recognise this, we adopt an alternative consumption rule to (E5). 
We determine real consumption in the policy case by ensuring that real national savings stays 
on its basecase path. An additional benefit of this approach is that the deviation in real 
consumption can now be interpreted as a welfare measure. We define real savings ( ) as: RS
R IS [GNDI C G]/ P= − −                (E10)     
where  is the investment price deflatorIP
24.  
Substituting (E7) into (E10) and converting the resulting expression to percentage change 
form, we have: 
          (E11) P G
P G
S( ) GDP( ) INT INT
TRN TRN C( ) G( )
R I GDP GDP P G
P G C C G
s p p x int int
trn trn p x p x
+ = + − −
+ + − + − + G
where S is nominal savings. In the policy case we hold foreign transfers and real public 
consumption at their basecase levels ( Ptrn = =Gtrn Gx =0). Re-arranging (E11), and dividing 
through by GDP, we have: 
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P G
C C X M C I
C INT C INT C S
(1/S ) (1/S )(S S ) (1/S )[S S ]
(1/S )S (1/S )S (1/ S )S
C GDP X M I
P G R
Sx x p p
int int s
= + − + −
− − −
p
        (E12) 
where  is N expressed as a share of GDP.  NS
In our VAT simulations, we hold policy-case real savings on its basecase path. That is, the 
deviation in real savings ( ) is zero. As such, (E12) determines Rs Cx  and (E9) determines ϑ . 
With (E12) operational (that is,  exogenous), changes in the price of investment (Rs Ip ) will 
have only a small effect on real consumption ( Cx ) since I SS S≈ .   
 In using (E12) as the basis for our real consumption decomposition, we go one step 
further, noting that the two interest payment variables ( Pint  and ) can be decomposed 
into a debt and exchange rate term. This proves helpful in Section 5 where we provide a 
detailed decomposition of our real consumption result. The level of interest paid by agent a on 
its foreign debt is ( ) is given by: 
Gint
aINT
           (E13) a aINT NETDEBT R /= × a Φ
−
where  is the net foreign debt of agent a in foreign currency terms,  is the 
interest rate on that debt, and  is the nominal exchange rate (expressed as units of foreign 
currency per dong). Noting that we assume  is exogenous to our VAT simulation, the 




a aint netdebt= φ            (E14)  
Substituting (E14)  into (E12) we have: 
   
P G P
C C X M C I S C
C INT C INT C INT INT
(1/S ) (1/S )(S S ) (1/ S )[S S ] (1/S )S
(1/ S )S (1/S )S (1/S )[S S ]
C GDP X M I
P G G
S Rx x p p p
netdebt netdebt
= + − + − −
− − + +
s
φ    (E15)  
 In Section 5 we use (E15) to explain our real consumption deviation. Table 1 reports 
the equation (E15) decomposition. In Table 1, it is clear our decomposition has three 
dimensions: time x effect x component. By time, we mean that since our model is dynamic, we 
can apply (E15) to any year of our dynamic path. In compiling Table 1, we choose years 1 
(2008) and 10 (2018). By effect, we mean the contribution to real consumption made by the 
individual right hand side elements of (E15). These are identified and described in the first 
column of Table 1. By component, we mean that our VAT simplification program can be 
viewed as comprised of two components: (i) reduced compliance costs, and (ii) rate 
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equalisation and exemption removal. The contribution to the real consumption deviation made 
by the two components can be identified by running two simulations: (a) one in which only 
compliance costs are reduced, and (b) one in which only rates are equalised and exemptions 
removed. The contributions made by these components are identified in columns (2) and (3) 
(for 2008) and (6) and (7) (for 2018). Since the model is non-linear, we must also report 
results for a simulation in which compliance costs are reduced and VAT rates and exemptions 
are changed simultaneously (Columns 5 and 9)25.  
5. THE MACROECONOMIC AND SECTORAL EFFECTS OF VAT 
SIMPLIFCATION 
5.1.  Overview: Short and long-run real consumption effects of VAT simplification 
In Table 1, we see that the full VAT program lifts real private consumption spending by 
0.96 per cent in the short-run, and 0.85 per cent in the long run. (row 8, columns 5 and 9). 
Approximately 70 per cent of the consumption deviation is due to reduced compliance and 
administrative costs, with the remaining 30 per cent due to VAT rate equalisation and 
exemption removal. Here, we summarise the main economic mechanisms responsible for the 
consumption deviations reported in Table 1. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we expand our discussion 
of results.     
 Lower compliance and administrative costs contribute to both short-run and long-run real 
private consumption gains mainly by raising real GDP relative to basecase (row 1, columns 2 
and 6). The long-run real GDP contribution to consumption (row 1, column 6) is greater than 
the short-run contribution (row 1, column 2) because lower compliance costs promote long-
run capital accumulation. However this capital is largely financed by foreign borrowing. This 
accounts for the negative contribution to long-run real consumption made by the private debt 
effect (row 4, column 6). With lower compliance costs, the terms of trade makes a small 
positive contribution to real consumption in the short-run (row 2, column 2) but a negative 
contribution in the long-run (row 2, column 6). In the short-run, reducing compliance costs 
promotes investment. This causes a positive terms of trade deviation, which contributes 0.03 
percentage points to the short-run real consumption deviation (row 2, column 2). However in 
the long-run, reduced compliance costs lower the terms of trade by expanding the size of the 
economy. This damps the long-run real consumption deviation (row 2, column 6). 
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 (Table 1 about here) 
 
VAT rate equalisation and exemption removal contributes about one quarter of a per cent 
to real private consumption in both the short-run and long-run (row 8, columns 3 and 7). In 
the short-run, the VAT changes promote consumption largely via higher terms of trade. The 
VAT changes lower the cost of investment, lifting rates of return and thus lifting investment. 
In the short-run, this positive investment deviation pushes the balance of trade towards deficit, 
generating a positive terms of trade deviation. The movement towards trade deficit requires 
real exchange rate appreciation. This lowers the real burden of Vietnam’s foreign liabilities, 
which are denominated in foreign currency terms. This accounts for the positive contribution 
of the real exchange rate effect (row 6, column 3). In the long-run, the VAT changes 
contribute to real consumption largely via higher real GDP (row 1, column 7). Long-run real 
GDP is higher because the VAT changes promote capital accumulation. The financing of this 
capital accumulation reduces long-run real consumption by 0.09 per cent (row 2, column 3). 
The short-run terms of trade contribution (row 2, column 3) exceeds that of the long-run (row 
2, column 7) because the VAT changes induce a sharp short-run deviation in real investment. 
The real investment deviation is attenuated in the long-run by the gradual return of rates of 
return to their basecase levels. 
We expand on these results in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.       
5.2. Effects of compliance cost reduction, rate equalisation and exemption removal 
Figures 1 to 4 report macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of the full VAT simplification 
program. The program generates positives deviations in real investment, the capital stock and 
real GDP (Figures 1 and  2). In Fig. 2 we see that the policy is strongly investment promoting. 
Hence in the short-run the policy shifts the balance of trade towards deficit, generating a 
transitory improvement in the terms of trade (Fig. 3). Throughout the simulation period, real 
private consumption is significantly above basecase (Fig. 2). Fig. 4 reports results for seven 
broad sectors, aggregating results for the full 113 industries of the model. The policy 
promotes positive deviations in output of all sectors. It is particularly favourable for dwellings 
and construction. As already discussed, these results can be understood as the joint effects of 
a productivity improvement (arising from lower compliance and administrative costs) and the 
program of rate equalisation and exemption removal. Hence we investigate two additional 
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simulations: one in which compliance costs are reduced (Figures 5-9) and one in which VAT 
rates are equalised and exemptions are removed (Figures 10-15). 
5.3.  The effects of lowering compliance and administrative costs 
Figures 5-9 report the macroeconomic and sectoral effects of lower compliance costs. As 
discussed in Section 4, we model lower compliance costs as an improvement in primary 
factor productivity relative to basecase. With short-run real consumer wages sticky, the 
positive deviation in productivity generates a short-run positive employment deviation (Fig. 
5). Together with the positive deviation in productivity, this accounts for the initial positive 
deviation in real GDP. The real wage rises so long as employment remains above basecase. 
This accounts for the long-run movement of the employment deviation towards zero. Despite 
the return of employment to basecase, the growing positive capital deviation (Fig. 5) ensures 
that the real GDP deviation remains just under 0.5 per cent throughout the period.  
Capital stocks take time to adjust. Hence in the short-run, the positive deviations in both 
productivity and employment produce a positive deviation in the average rate of return. In 
Fig. 6, this is expressed as a positive deviation in the average capital rental price relative to 
the investment price deflator. This explains the initial spike in the investment deviation (Fig. 
6). With real investment above basecase, the capital deviation grows through time. The capital 
deviation continues to grow until rates of return tend back to basecase. In Fig. 6, this is 
apparent in the convergence of the deviations in the investment price deflator and average 
capital rental rate.    
 The short-run real private consumption deviation is just under 0.7 per cent (Fig. 7). 
This exceeds the real GDP deviation by 0.3 percentage points. Our real consumption 
decomposition (Table 1, column 2) explains why. Since our consumption closure keeps real 
savings on its basecase path throughout the policy simulation (via E15), the real GDP effect 
(row 1, column 1, Table 1) requires the real consumption deviation to exceed the real GDP 
deviation. Together with the short-run spike in real investment, this causes the real GNE 
deviation to exceed the real GDP deviation. This pushes the real balance of trade towards 
deficit, apparent in Fig. 8 as a short-run positive deviation in import volumes relative to 
export volumes. In Fig. 8 we see the import deviation tracks the real GDP deviation quite 
closely. This is an activity effect: with GDP, real consumption and investment higher than 
basecase, import usage is also higher than basecase. With our macro closure allowing only 
limited scope for movements in the balance of trade, the strong positive import deviation 
requires that the export deviation also be positive. This accounts for the negative deviation in 
the terms of trade (Fig. 8). This is an important factor in explaining why the long-run real 
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consumption deviation is lower than the short-run deviation (compare columns 6 and 2, row 
2, of Table 1). Another factor damping the long-run consumption deviation is foreign debt 
accumulation. With real savings held on its basecase path, the investment responsible for the 
positive capital deviation (Fig. 5) is financed by foreign savings. In 2018, interest on this debt 
is worth 0.07 percentage points of the potential real consumption deviation (row 4, column 6, 
Table 1).  
5.4. Effects of rate equalisation and exemption removal alone 
Figures 10 - 15 report the macroeconomic consequences of equalising VAT rates at 8.3 per 
cent and removing discretionary exemptions. This has a favourable effect on real private 
consumption spending, lifting it by just over one quarter of a per cent (relative to basecase) 
throughout the simulation period (Fig. 10). Columns (3) and (7) of Table 1 provide short-run 
and long-run decompositions of the real consumption outcome. As we explain below, in the 
short-run, the positive consumption deviation arises from the positive terms of trade 
deviation. Favourable terms of trade is less important for the long-run consumption deviation 
(row 2, column 7, Table 1). The favourable long-run consumption deviation is due mainly to 
the positive deviation in real GDP (row 1, column 7, Table 1) offset by the need to finance 
foreign capital suppliers (row 4, column 7, Table 1).    
A prominent feature of the macroeconomic consequences of our changes to VAT rates and 
exemptions is the strong short-run positive deviation in real investment relative to real GDP 
(Fig. 10). This is due largely to reductions in VAT rates paid on inputs to dwellings 
construction. As discussed in Section 2, VAT paid on most inputs to capital formation is 
refunded. An important exception is dwellings construction. Inputs of construction services to 
dwellings investment are initially taxed at 10 per cent. Our policy of equalisation of VAT 
rates brings this rate to 8.3 per cent. In the short-run, this lowers the cost of dwellings capital 
formation. At the economy-wide level, this manifests as a fall in the price of investment 
relative to the GDP deflator (Fig. 11). Since the negative deviation in the price of investment 
is greater than the negative deviation in the capital rental rate (Fig. 11), the average rate of 
return deviation is positive. This accounts for the strong positive deviation in investment, and 
the resulting growing positive deviation in the capital stock (Fig. 10).  
The growing deviation in the capital stock accounts for the growing real GDP deviation 
(Fig. 12). By 2018, real GDP is 0.16 per cent above basecase (Fig. 12). Ceteris paribus, this 
lifts real private consumption by 0.26 per cent (row 1, column 7, Table 1). However the real 
GDP deviation is due largely to the positive capital deviation (Fig. 12). Since we hold real 
savings on its basecase path, only the difference between the return on capital and the foreign 
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cost of that capital is available for domestic consumption. The long-run cost of financing 
foreign capital reduces private consumption spending by 0.09 percentage points (row 4, 
column 7, Table 1).    
  Note that in the first year of the simulation, the real GDP deviation is near zero, despite a 
0.10 per cent negative employment deviation and no change in the capital stock26 (Fig. 12). 
The small short-run negative employment deviation is due to our assumption of short-run 
stickiness in the real consumer wage. Equalisation of VAT rates at a level that is revenue 
neutral in the presence of exemption removal involves a shift in the indirect tax load, away 
from production and investment and towards consumption. This causes the consumption 
deflator to rise relative to the GDP deflator. With real consumer wages sticky in the short-run, 
this generates a short-run positive deviation in the real producer wage, causing employment to 
fall relative to basecase27. Since wages represent approximately 52 per cent of Vietnam’s 
GDP at factor cost, we might have expected the 2008 real GDP deviation to be approximately 
-0.05 per cent (=-0.10*0.52), not 0. The difference (+0.05 per cent) represents the small 
allocative efficiency gain from VAT rate equalisation.  
In the short-run, with the real investment deviation greatly exceeding the real GDP 
deviation, the real balance of trade must move towards deficit relative to basecase (Fig. 13). 
The resulting negative deviation in export volumes causes the terms of trade to improve 
relative to basecase (Fig. 13). As our real consumption decomposition makes clear, the 
improvement in the short-run terms of trade accounts for much of the short-run positive 
deviation in real consumption (column 3, row 2, Table 1). However, not all of the terms of 
trade gain is attributable to the strong deviation in investment relative to real GDP. As we 
argue below, changes in exemptions also contribute to the positive terms of trade deviation.     
      Figures 14 and 15 report output deviations for seven broad sectors. Fig. 14 reports the 
output deviations of the three sectors experiencing the largest positive output gains 
(dwellings, construction and mining). It also reports the deviation in the price to households 
of dwellings services. The effects of reducing the VAT rate on inputs to dwellings 
construction are clearly visible in the dwellings output and price deviations. Initially, reducing 
the VAT rate on inputs to dwellings construction has no effect on dwellings output. However 
it lifts the rate of return on new dwellings capital. This lifts output of the construction sector 
relative to basecase. With housing construction higher than basecase, the capital stock of the 
dwellings sector begins to rise relative to basecase. This accounts for the growing positive 
deviation in output of dwellings services (Fig. 14). Over time, the fall in the construction cost 
of dwellings capital is passed through to consumers in the form of lower dwellings rental rates 
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via an increase in the supply of dwellings capital. This accounts for the growing negative 
deviation in the price of housing (Fig. 14)28. A decade after the reform, the rental price of 
housing is 1.6 per cent below basecase, and housing supply is 1.4 per cent higher than 
basecase. Revenue-neutral VAT rate equalisation thus materially advances a major element of 
Vietnam’s development policy, promotion of low-cost housing29.   
After dwellings and construction, mining is the sector next most favourably affected by 
rate equalisation and exemption removal (Fig. 14). This reflects the removal of exemptions on 
exports of the mining sector. Via (E2), removal of exemptions on mining exports increases 
mining’s refund factor30. Via (E3), this reduces the effective intermediate input taxes paid by 
the sector. This flows through to lower mining output prices. This accounts for the large real 
appreciation generated by rate equalisation and exemption removal (Fig. 13). Since the 
deviation in aggregate export volumes is largely tied-down by the import volume deviation 
and the relative deviations in real GDP and real GNE, a large negative deviation in the 
relative export price of one commodity (mining in this case) requires real appreciation to 
crowd-out other exports. This accounts for the sustained positive deviation in the real 
exchange rate. The positive real exchange rate deviation peaks in the first years of the policy, 
when the positive deviation in real investment pushes the real balance of trade sharply 
towards deficit. To achieve this deficit, the real appreciation must be higher than that required 
simply to eliminate the effect on export prices of exemption removal. By crowding-out non-
mining exports, the real appreciation contributes to the short-run real consumption deviation 
via improved terms of trade. However it also contributes to the short-run real consumption 
deviation via a reduction in the domestic currency value of foreign debt obligations. This 
effect is measured in row 6 of Table 1. It is strongest in the short-run, adding 0.05 percentage 
points to the 2008 real consumption deviation.     
Fig. 15 reports results for the four sectors that experience the lowest output deviations as a 
result of VAT rate equalisation and exemption removal. Both utilities and services sell 
substantial proportions of their output to households. Hence production in both sectors is 
stimulated by the positive real consumption deviation. Expansion of utilities output is also 
promoted directly by VAT rate equalisation: the VAT rate on electricity and gas falls from 10 
per cent to 8.3 per cent, promoting greater household consumption of electricity and gas.   
VAT rate equalisation and exemption removal produce negative deviations in output of 
agriculture and manufactures. Both sectors are trade-exposed, and thus adversely affected by 
the real appreciation. The deviation in agricultural output is deepest in the first year of the 
policy. This is the year of strongest real appreciation (Fig. 13). However, agricultural output 
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slowly recovers, ending the period just below its basecase level (Fig. 15). Manufactures 
output also experiences a negative deviation in the first year, but does not recover (Fig. 15). 
The pattern of trough and gradual recovery in agriculture’s output can be traced to an 
expansion in sales by agriculture to domestic food manufacturing. The policy includes 
removal of exemptions on sales by some food manufacturers, thus lowering their post-tax 
input costs. The policy also reduces the VAT rates for other food products from 10 to 8.3 
percent31. Together, these changes promote output expansion as price-sensitive agents 
substitute towards the now-cheaper domestically produced food. The positive deviation in the 
output of food manufacturing (not shown) stimulates domestic sales of agriculture, a major 
supplier to domestic food manufacturing industries. Despite a positive deviation in output of 
food manufacturing industries, the aggregate output deviation for the manufacturing sector is 
negative (Fig. 15). Outside of the food manufacturing industries, no other industries within 
the manufacturing sector benefit from exemption-related reductions in tax-inclusive input 
costs. This leaves them exposed to real appreciation. The net negative deviation in output of 
manufacturing is due to real-appreciation-induced negative deviations in output of such trade-
exposed industries as machinery and equipment, TCF, metal products, and wood and paper 
products.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
With their many commodities and agents, CGE models are well-suited to analysis of a 
complex tax like VAT. A detailed VAT modelling framework, such as that which we present 
in this paper, is important in CGE analysis of VAT issues for two reasons. First,  it allows the 
model’s tax theory to address the full details of the VAT system as implemented by tax 
authorities. Second, it facilitates correct representation of VAT payments in the model’s 
database. Statistical agencies often get the latter wrong by assuming that all VAT falls on 
private consumption. Ensuring that the database is correct in this respect is essential if we are 
to have an initial solution to our CGE model that is consistent with our VAT tax theory. 
However, even in a CGE model without sophisticated VAT theory, correct representation of 
the distribution of indirect taxation in the model’s database is important for welfare analysis. 
Measured welfare effects of policy change are influenced by the size and distribution of the 
model’s indirect tax wedges. Hence we expect the framework we present in this paper will 
also be of value to those CGE model builders who, while perhaps not interested in detailed 
modelling of VAT, are nevertheless keen to ensure that their model’s database accurately 
depicts the structure of indirect tax payments.    
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We apply our tax model to the Vietnamese VAT system. This system has been in place 
since 1999. Despite many amendments, it remains overly complex, with three rates and a 
large number of exemptions. We examine the consequences of a tax reform whereby the three 
rates are replaced with a single rate that is revenue neutral in the presence of simultaneous 
removal of many discretionary VAT exemptions. We find that VAT simplification advances 
Vietnam development goals. Real private consumption, our welfare measure, is increased by 
an average of 0.9 per cent relative to basecase. We distinguish the effects of compliance cost 
reduction and the effects of VAT rate equalisation and exemption removal. The latter 
contributes about one third of our welfare gain, largely via a reduction in the rate of indirect 
taxation on capital accumulation. One effect of reducing indirect taxes on investment is 
promotion of housing supply. By 2018 our VAT policy lifts the stock of housing by 1.4 per 
cent and lowers the price of housing by 1.6 per cent. Lower compliance and administrative 
costs account for about two-thirds of our welfare gain. Our estimate of the fall in compliance 
and administrative costs arising from VAT simplification is illustrative, but plausible. We 
hope our estimate will stimulate interest in a more detailed study of VAT compliance and 
administrative costs for Vietnam.  
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Table 1: Real private consumption decomposition via Equation (E15) (percentage deviation from basecase) 
 2008  2018 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)















1. Real GDP effect C(1/S ) GDPx  0.66 0.00 0.00 0.66  0.75 0.26 0.00 1.01 
2. Terms of trade effect C X M(1/S )(S S )X Mp p−  0.03 0.25 0.00 0.29  -0.11 0.12 0.00 0.01 
3. Investment price effect C I S(1/S )[S S ] Ip−  -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.06  0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 
4. Private debt effect - PC INT(1/ S )S Pnetdebt  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.16 








6. Exchange rate effect P GC INT INT(1/ S )[S S ]φ+  0.02 0.05 0.00 0.07  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 
  7. Total BOTE equation (15)   0.70 0.25 0.01 0.96  0.57 0.27 0.00 0.84







































































Fig. 5: Real GDP, employment and the capital stock. Compliance costs only.                   














Fig. 6: Rates of return and real investment. Compliance costs only.  
















Fig. 7: Real private consumption, investment and GDP. Compliance costs only.   
















Fig. 8: Export volumes, import volumes and the terms of trade. Compliance costs only.    






































Fig. 10: Real private consumption, investment and GDP. VAT rate equalisation and 















Fig. 11: Rates of return and real investment. VAT rate equalisation and exemption removal 






















Fig. 12: Employment, capital and real GDP.. VAT rate equalisation and exemption removal 


















Fig. 13: Export volumes, import volumes and the terms of trade.  VAT rate equalisation 
















Fig. 14: Output of the top three sectors, and the price of dwellings services. VAT rate 

















Fig. 15: Output of the bottom four sectors. VAT rate equalisation and exemption removal 
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1 By mid 2006 there were around 140 countries with a VAT (Bird and Gendron, 2007).  
2 For comprehensive reviews of VAT systems, see Bird and Gendron, 2007; Ebrill et al., 2001; and 
Cnossen, 1998.  
3  See for example Fullerton et al. (1984), McLure (1990, p.38), and Fehr et al.( 1995, pp. 39-40). 
4 See for example Tait (1988) and Ebrill et al. (2001). 
5 See for example Tran-Nam Binh (2000, 2001). 
6 The VIPAG (Vietnam Policy Advisory Group) model was developed in 2008 for the Vietnam 
Ministry of Finance by the Centre of Policy Studies, Monash University, under UNDP-funded project 
VIE/03/010.   
7 While the number of industries and commodities are identical in the model, SOc,j is not a diagonal 
matrix. On the contrary, the Vietnamese economy is characterised by a high level of multiproduction 
(Policy Advisory Group, 2007)   
8 In this example we also assume that textbooks are the only component of publishing that is VAT 
exempt. 
9 Note that SOc,j and SSc,u are coefficients, not variables. They are evaluated from the input-output 
data that forms part of the CGE model’s initial solution. 
10 Gottfried and Wiegard (1991) note that this pattern of distribution of the VAT burden is well 
known among VAT experts. They provide an example using the 1984 input-output table for Germany, 
in which 63% of total VAT revenues fell on consumption expenditure, 21% on intermediate products  
and 16% on inputs to capital formation.  
11 In the long-run, employment is determined by demographic and labour market factors, such as 
the size of the labour force, participation rates, and the number of working hours. We assume these 
factors are unaffected by indirect tax reform.   
12 We generate the basecase using the method developed by Dixon and Rimmer (2002). We use the 
following data and assumptions: (1) Actual GDP growth rates for the period 2006-2007 (GSO, 2009) 
and forecast growth rates for 2008-2012 (IMF, 2007). We assume that from 2012-2018 the economy 
continues to grow at its 2012 level; (2) An annual growth rate of 1.2 per cent for employment and 
population. This is an average of the forecast for the period by ILO (2006); (3) A growth rate of 0.14 
per cent per annum in land supply, which we base on past trends. 
13 The consumption taxes include value added tax (VAT), special consumption tax, the gasoline fee, 
and registration tax. In 2005, total consumption tax revenue was VND 69,184.6 billion, of which VAT 
was VND 45,878 billion. The special consumption tax is levied only on some luxury goods, the 
gasoline fee is levied on petroleum, and registration taxes are levied primarily on sales to households of 
transportation means and dwellings services.  
14 Another estimate of the time spent on VAT compliance by an average enterprise (MOF 2007b) is 
far higher, of the order of 1700 hours per year. This estimate has been credibly disputed by Vietnamese 
tax authorities. They argue it incorrectly includes time spent on invoice preparation and filing, activities 
independent of VAT. Hence we do not use this estimate.  
15 300 hours is equivalent to the employment of about 0.16 of a full-time accountant over a whole 
year (assuming 40 working hours per week, and 48 working weeks per year). An average wage for an 
accountant in 2005 was about 3 million VND per month (see Osaka Senken Ltd., 2006; and Viet 
Phong, 2006).   
16 Covering costs such as office space and equipment, payment for tax advice, accounting software 
upgrades, tax training, stationary and storage of invoices 
17 In our model, the ratio of non-labour costs to labour costs in the accounting services industry is 
1.6:1. We use this as a proxy for the structure of the VAT compliance activity in each firm. However, 
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since VAT compliance activities will share some facilities with other activities, we adopt a ratio of 
non-labour costs to labour costs for VAT compliance that is lower than 1.6:1, namely, 1:1. 
18 We base this on the Establishment Census 2002 estimate of the number of businesses (GSO, 
2004), and the Ministry of Finance’s (MOF, 2006) estimate of the number of new businesses registered 
during the period 2002-2005. 
19 Variable costs include both labour and some non-labour costs.  
20 Available from Establishment Census (GSO, 2004) 
21 We have discussed our estimates of private and public VAT costs with Vietnamese tax experts in 
the Vietnamese General Department of Taxation. They found our estimates plausible. They provided 
two additional observations to support our public administration cost estimate. First, researchers at the 
Vietnamese Institute of Financial Sciences drew our attention to the fact that the Vietnamese 
government allows taxation departments to use 2% of total tax revenues to cover their costs. There is 
evidence that the administration costs of VAT are higher than those of other taxes (see Brown and 
Vaillancourt, 1986, cited in Vaillancourt and Clemens 2007). Hence VAT administration costs are 
likely to be higher than 2% of VAT revenues. Second, an unpublished study by the Vietnamese 
General Department of Taxation  (Nguyen Minh Huong, 2007) found that the administrative costs 
associated with collecting VAT from the million smallest enterprises registered for VAT comprised 
about 9-10% of VAT collected from these enterprises. Since such costs fall with the size of a business, 
one VAT expert at the Vietnamese General Department of Taxation (Nguyen Minh Huong) viewed our 
3.5% estimate as plausible for the economy as a whole.  
22 Vaillancourt and Clemens (2008) founds that the compliance costs associated with VAT range 
between 3.7 and 7.3 per cent of total VAT collections. Expressed as a proportion of GDP, these costs 
represent 0.16 per cent of UK GDP, 0.44 per cent of New Zealand GDP, and 0.30 per cent of Sweden’s 
GDP. Tran-Nam Binh (2000) estimates the recurrent compliance costs of Australia’s VAT at about 8 
per cent of 2000/01 VAT revenue. This represented about 0.30 per cent of Australian GDP.  
23 To simplify, assume that GDP is the same as GNDI. Then a typical closure for consumption 
spending is: PCXC = Φ PGDP XGDP, where PC is the price of consumption (public and private), XC is real 
consumption, Φ is the average propensity to consume, PGDP is the GDP deflator, and XGDP is real GDP. 
To simplify further, assume that trade is balanced. Then, rearranging for XC we have  XC = XGDP 
[(PI/PC)SI][(PX/PM) ST] where PI is the investment price deflator, PX is the export price deflator, PM is the 
import price deflator, and SI and ST are the shares of investment and trade in GDP respectively. From 
this equation we see that a consumption/GDP (or consumption GNDI) link will see real consumption 
fall if the price of investment falls relative to the price of consumption.   
24 Where investment is defined to include both gross fixed capital formation and additions to stocks.  
25 We can see that interaction between the two sets of shocks is low, since the values in residual 
columns (4) and (8) are very small. 
26 We assume that movements in capital follow movements in investment with an average half-year 
lag. Since the changes in VAT rates and exemptions occur in 2008, capital stocks do not begin 
adjusting until 2009.  
27 The risk of short-run employment loss from a rise in consumption taxation is also identified in 
Dixon and Rimmer (1999). They show that the possibility of employment loss during the transition to 
the new tax rate can be reduced by promoting after-tax wage bargaining and delivering a labour tax cut 
calibrated to compensate for the tax-induced rise in consumer prices. 
28 The deviation in the price of housing is positive in the first year of the simulation because the real 
consumption deviation is positive in this year, increasing demand for housing services. However the 
supply of housing stocks have not yet had time to begin adjusting upwards.   
29 In aiming to meet the United Nations Millenium Development Goals, an important element of the 
Vietnamese government’s Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, 2003) is affordable housing development for low income people in urban areas and areas 
affected by natural calamity (such as flood-prone regions of the Mekong Delta). 
30 Vietnamese VAT laws stipulate that exports of mining products are exempt from VAT. This 
seems unusual, since exports have zero VAT rates. Our discussions with Vietnamese tax authorities 
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confirmed that mining is input-taxed to the extent that it exports. The mining sector in Vietnam is 
heavily export-oriented, exporting 88.6 percent of its output (mainly crude oil and gas). Our 
calculations show that in 2005 the effective VAT rate on intermediate inputs to mining production was 
6.2 per cent, and revenues from this source comprised 2.3 per cent of total VAT revenue. 
31 Among 65 industries comprising the Manufactures sector, 14 belong to the food processing 
sector. Partial exemptions apply to meat, fruit and vegetables, and seafood. The ten per cent rate applies 
to many other food products, such as dairy products, oils and fats, bakery and confectionary, alcohol 
and wine, beer, coffee, and tea. Only rice and sugar products are taxed at 5 per cent.  
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